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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented an this appeal: 
1. Whether the defendant has established that a substantial change 
of circumstances has occurred since the entry of the Decree of Divorce which 
change of circumstances were not contemplated by the Decree itself. 
2. Whether defendant has established that it would be in the best 
interest of the minor child to be placed into the care, custody and control of 
the defendant. 
3. Whether trial court aoused its discretion m finding that it 
would be in the best interest of the minor child to be placed into the care, 
custody and control of the defendant. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. Section 30-3-5 (1) (1984): 
Disposition of property - Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Court to 
have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and 
visitation — Termination of alimony. — The 
Court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders as to...the 
custody of the childien...as is reasonable and 
necessary. 
UTAH CODE ANN. Section 30-3-10 (1977): 
Custody of children. — In determining custody 
the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child and the past conduct and demonstrated 
moral standards of each of the parties. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENISE A. HIRSCH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
FRANK L. HIRSCH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 20966 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Frank L. Hirsch, in February of 1985, commenced an action 
seeking modification of a Decree of Divorce dated May 2, 1984. The defendant 
sought to have the custody of the minor child changed from plaintiff to the 
defendant. The matter was heard in the Third Judicial District Court on 
October 15, 1985, before the Honorable Dean E. Conder. The court modified the 
Decree of Divorce specifically awarding the defendant the care, custody and 
control of the minor child. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married on the 22nd day of September, 
1979. On June 14, 1980, a minor child was born as issue of said marriage, 
to-wit: Cody Dale Hirsch. The plaintiff and defendant separated m January, 
1983. From January, 1983 through April, 1984, the defendant had the custody of 
the minor child. (Tr at 17). In May, 1984, pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, 
the plaintiff was awarded the care, custody and control of the minor child. 
Nevertheless, from April, 1984, through February, 1985, plaintiff allowed the 
defendant to retain the care, custody and control of the minor child. (Tr at 
21). At the modification hearing before Judge Conder, the defendant testified 
that the minor child was in his care from April, 1984, through February, 1985. 
(Tr at 21). The defendant's testimony was substantiated by the testimony of 
defendant's minor child of a previous marriage who lived with defendant and the 
minor child from November, 1984, through June, 1985. (Tr at 41). The defen-
dant's testimony was further substantiated by the testimony of defendant's 
mother who cared for the minor child from April, 1984, through November, 1984. 
(Tr at 48, 49). Commencing in November, 1984, the minor child was babysat by 
Mrs. Judy Kathleen Watts. During the months of November and December of 1984, 
and January and February of 1985, Mrs. Watts testified that the defendant or 
the defendant's child of a previous marriage would pick up the minor child, 
Cody Dale Hirsch, from her home. The plaintiff only picked up the minor child 
on three occasions. (Tr at 54, 55). 
The plaintiff married Robert J. King in April, 1984. Since the 
divorce, the plaintiff has moved six (6) times, the last time to the State of 
California. (Tr at 33, 34). The husband of the plaintiff further testified 
that at one period of time he wanted the plaintiff to give the defendant the 
custody of the minor child while plaintiff and her new husband had a honey-
moon. (Tr at 35) . The plaintiff, m her testimony, has further stated that 
she has, on occasion, used cocaine. (Tr at 85) . 
The defendant has had the care, custody and control of the minor 
child since November 18, 1985. The defendant testified at trial that he has 
the ability to adequately care for the minor child and provide the daily needs 
of the child. (Tr at 22) . The defendant further testified that he had the 
full support of his family in seeing that the child had stability in his life. 
(Tr at 23). The defendant and the minor child have a bond between them which 
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defendant testified is unbelieveable and everyone has stated to defendant how 
much love there is between them. (Tr at 22) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Order of the Honorable Judge Dean E. Conder, which modified the 
Decree of Divorce by granting custody of the minor child to defendant, should 
be upheld on the following basis: 
1. The trial court had continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders as to the custody of the minor child. Furthermore, the 
order was reasonable and necessary due to the following: (a) the minor child 
had lived with the defendant from January, 1983 through April, 1984, and April, 
1984, through May, 1985; (b) the number of times plaintiff had moved; and (c) 
plaintiff having used cocaine. 
2. The defendant established that there had been a substantial 
change of circumstances since the entry of the decree and not contemplated by 
the decree itself. The change in circumstances were as follows: (a) defen-
dant had the minor child the majority of the time since the entry of the 
decree; (b) the plaintiff had moved six (6) times since the entry of the 
decree; and (c) the plaintiff admitted that she had used cocaine. Because of 
these changes in circumstances, the court determined it would be in the 
best interest of the minor child to be placed m the care, custody and control 
of the defendant. 
3. The Court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded the 
defendant the care, custody and control of the minor child. The evidence 
clearly showed a substantial change of circumstances had occurred since the 
Decree of Divorce and clearly showed that it would be in the best interest of 
the minor child to be placed in the defendant's home. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO CHANGE CUSTODY 
OF THE MINOR CHILD FROM PLAINTIFF TO DEFENDANT 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(3) states: 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes 
or new orders as to . . . the custody of the children . . . as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
Applying this Statute to the present case, it is clear that the 
lower Court had jurisdiction to change custody from the plaintiff mother to the 
defendant father. The Court's decision to change the custody of the minor 
child from the plaintiff to the defendant was reasonable when one considers 
the minor child lived with the defendant from January of 1983 through April of 
1984 and then the majority of the time from April of 1984 through May of 1985. 
Furthermore, the decision to change custody was reasonable in that the plain-
tiff had moved six (6) times during a two (2) year period and the plaintiff had 
admitted using cocaine. 
The change of custody from the plaintiff mother to the defendant 
father was necessary in that the minor child had been with his father the 
majority of the time and had developed a strong bond between himself and his 
father. The change of custody was further necessary in that the minor child 
had the need of having some stability m his life which his father could 
provide by having a home which the child could actually call home. 
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poiisrr I I 
A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED SINCE THE 
ENTRY OF THE DECREE OF DIVMCE AND DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED 
THOSE CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
" . . . the trial court's decision whether to modify the 
provisions of a custody decree to transfer custody to 
another party involves two steps: (1) an initial decision 
whether there are changed circumstances warranting the 
exercise of the court's continuing jurisdiction to reconsi-
der the custody awarded, and, if so (2) a subsequent 
decision as to the manner in which custody should be 
modified, if at all." Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah, 
1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court has further stated as to step one (1): 
"In the initial step, the court will receive evidence only 
as to the nature and materiality of any changes in those 
circumstances upon which the earlier award of custody was 
based. In this step, the party seeking modification must 
demonstrate (1) that since the time of the previous decree, 
there have been changes in the circumstances upon which 
the previous award was based; and (2) that those changes 
are sufficiently substantial and material to justify 
reopening the question of custody." Id. at 54. 
The defendant m the present case met the burden of proof as to 
establishing that there had been a material change of circumstances since the 
entry of the Divorce Decree on May 2, 1984. The change of circumstances which 
were material and substantial were that the minor child had lived with the 
defendant the majority of the time from May, 1984 until May, 1985. The 
testimony of the defendant and the minor chi Id of the defendant by a previous 
marriage established the fact that the minor child, Cody Dale Hirsch, was in 
the defendant's nome the majority of the time. (Tr at 17, 21). The minor 
child's grandmother and babysitter further substantiated the fact that the 
defendant had the child the majority of the time. (Tr at 48, 49). The 
babysitter1 testimony was that the plaintiff picked up the minor child during 
the months of November and December, 1984 and January and February, 1985 only 
three (3) times. (Tr at 54, 55). 
The plaintiff, Denise A. Hirsch, did not want to be a mother and 
care for and maintain the minor child during the marriage or after the 
divorce. The plaintiff wanted to be a mother only when it was convenient to 
her. 
The testimony of the plaintiff's new husband during trial was that 
during 1983 through 1985 the plaintiff and himself had moved approximately six 
(6) times. The last move was to the State of California for approximately six 
(6) weeks. In California, plaintiff did not have custody of the child. 
Plaintiff eventually returned to Utah when this action was commenced. (Tr at 
33, 34). The continual moving of the plaintiff and plaintiff's new husband 
further shows a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the 
Divorce Decree. The continual moving is a material change of circumstances in 
that the minor child was unable to acquire any stability because of the moving 
from one location to another. Prior to, and after the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, the defendant had established a home wherein the minor child could 
acquire the stability created by a permanent residence. 
The plaintiff's testimony at trial was that she had used cocaine on 
occasion. (Tr at 85). This testimony is again further evidence of a material 
and substantial change of circumstance since the entry of the Decree m 1984. 
The defendant having the mi not child m his home the majority of the 
time, the plaintiff moving six (6) times during the past two (2) years, and the 
plaintiff's use of cocaine establishes that there has been a material change of 
circumstances since the entry of the Decree of Divorce in 1984. 
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POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED AND THE COURT DETERMINED 
THAT IT WOUU3 BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE MINOR 
CHIID TO BE PLACED IN THE CARE, CUSTODY AND CONTROL 
OF THE DEFENDANT. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-10 states: 
"In determining custody the court shall consider the best interest 
of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards 
of each of the parties." 
Considering the best interest of the child is the second step set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Hogge. The Supreme Court in regard to the 
second step has stated: 
"In the second step, having found that a substantial and material 
change in circumstances justifies a reconsideration of the custody 
award, the trial court must consider the changes in circumstance 
along with all other evidence relevant to the welfare or best 
interests of the child . . . The court must determine de novo which 
custody arrangement will serve the welfare or best interests of the 
child, and modify, or refuse t^o modify, the decree accordingly." 
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah, 1982). 
In the present case, the best interest of the child was best 
served by placing the minor child in the custody of the defendant. The 
individual who performed the custody evaluation found that the best interest of 
the child was served by being in the home of the defendant because the defen-
dant had the minor child approximately 80 to 90 percent of the time. (Tr. at 
6) . The evaluator further found that the defendant had established stability 
for the minor child by providing a permanent residence for the minor child. 
Furthermore, the best interest of the minor child was served because the minor 
child had established an "unbelieveable bond" with the defendant. (Tr. at 
22) . The defendant and the minor child had created a love between them that 
was known, not only by the defendant and the minor child, but by people with 
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whom the defendant associated. (Tr. at 22). 
The minor child at the present time is five (5) years old. He is at 
a point m his life when he has started to attend school and establish friend-
ships with other children at school and in his neighborhood. The defendant has 
tried to create a feeling of stability in the minor child by purchasing a home 
which he has owned since 1982. The defendant also has the full support of his 
family. (Tr. at 23). The defendant, along with his family, provides for the 
daily needs of the minor child. The defendant has cared for the minor child m 
the past and is fully capable of caring for the minor child in the future. 
The fact that the defendant has cared for the minor child the 
majority of the minor child's life and the fact that defendant has been able 
to create some stability in the minor child's life, should establish that the 
best interest of the minor child is served by remaining m the custody of his 
father, the defendant. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT AWARDED THE CARE, CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF THE 
MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
We accord considerable deference to the 
judgment of the trial court and interpose our 
own judgment only where the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary or the trial 
court abuses its discretion or misapplies 
principles of law. Mmeer v. Mmeer, 19 Utah 
Adv. Rep 6 (1985). 
In the present case the lower court did not abuse its discretion, 
because the defendant established that there had been a material change of 
circumstances since the entry of the decree of divorce and i*- would be in the 
best interest of the minor child to be placed m the home of the defendant. 
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The evidence was clear that the minor child had resided with the defendant the 
majority of the time since the entry of the decree, that the plaintiff had 
moved six (6) times during the past two years and had used cocaine on occa-
sion. The Court was correct in its application of the law in that the defen-
dant was required to show a material change of circumstances since the entry of 
the decree and also show that it would be in the best interest of the minor 
child to be placed in his care, custody and control. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant was required to show that there had been a substantial 
change of circumstances since the entry of the Divorce Decree in May, 1984. 
The defendant was further required to show that it was in the best interest of 
the minor child to be placed in the defendant's home. 
The defendant established, through testimony, that the following 
change of circumstances occurred since the entry of the Divorce Decree, (a) 
that the minor child was in his care almost exclusively from January, 1983 
until April, 1984 and the majority of the time from April, 1984 until May, 
1985; (b) that plaintiff, during the marriage as well as after the marriage, 
wanted to be a mother only when it was convenient to her; (c) the plaintiff had 
moved approximately six (6) times during a two (2) year period; and (d) that 
plaintiff also admitted to using cocaine. 
From the change of circumstances, defendant was able to establish 
that it was in the best interest of the minor child to be placed in the 
defendant's home. The defendant was able to show that he has been able to 
establish stability in the life of the minor child and provide the child with 
those things the child needs in his daily life. 
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Wherefore, the defendant respectfully asks this Court to uphold the 
decision of the lower Court and allow the defendant and the manor child the 
right to continue to have that bond which they share and allow the love they 
have for one another grow stronger. 
DATED this X ^ day of February, 1986. 
Respectfully Submitted 
NOLAN J. OLSE 
Attorney £&f Defendant-Respondent 
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It is hereby certified that four copies of the foregoing Brief of 
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